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Early Warning And Early Response Framework For Countering Violent Extremism In Mombasa County

2020

The framework was commissioned by
Collaboration of Women in Development.
It examines the Early Warning And Early Response
Framework For Countering Violent Extremism In
Mombasa County

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Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)	FIDA-Kenya
National Gender Equality Commission –(NGEC)	Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE)
Tunaweza Women With Disability organization	JUHUDUI Community Support Centre


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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARIS	Anonymous Reporting Information System
AVRSCS	Armed Violence Reduction and Strengthening Community Security
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response
CEWERUs	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
CPC	Community Policing Committees
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DPCs	District Peace Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ER	Early Response
EWER	Early warning and early response
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMT	International Monitoring Team
ISD	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
VE	Violent Extremism
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding



FORWARD.



For more than a decade now, the coastal part of Kenya and specifically Mombasa has been a theatre of conflicts, violence and insecurity. The effects of the insecurity have momentarily affected the economic, political, social and cultural filament of the community in general and particularly women and children have gotten multiples of mental, emotional and physical scars during this period.

Early Warning, Early Response is undeniably a valuable tool within the spectrum of action for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The main purpose of the EWER tool in Mombasa County is to contribute to strengthening a preventive approach in addressing social conflict as well as strengthening democratic governance, respect to human rights and the rule of law.

The tool functions to predict conflict trends, alert communities of danger, appraise decision-making provide inputs to response, strategy formulation, in addition to initiate responses for prevention of violent conflict. However, with the changing nature of conflicts, radicalizations and the emergence of new security challenges, high profile systemetical corruption, alongside the COVID-19 outbreak and a

relatively underfunded global peace and security architecture, it is important to consider whether existing early warning reporting systems are still relevant, and if so, whether they are equipped to deal with such an evolved security context.

Governments and international organisations are extremely reluctant to react to warnings which may prove false, lack of political will and/or resources habitually makes the whole exercise redundant, even when the need for response is obvious whereas the donors are increasingly keen in seeing proof that early warning has been responsible for averting crises amid the considerable high cost of these systems.

Building alliances with County and National Governments, the communities, religious leaders, grassroots organizations and global civil societies has become a corner pillar to bridging strategic weaknesses and creating enough critical mass to make an operational 'early warning – early response' link a reality. It is in this breath that CWID distinguishes that partnership with all stakeholders including the governments is counterproductive to present civil society as an alternative to the county and national authorities. This Framework is designed for use with diverse groups precisely women and men involved or interested in starting initiatives on Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism. It can as well be used for general sensitization. Advocacy, programming and development of policies and reporting systems toward P/CVE. In conclusion, the frame work for **Putting The Citizens In Front of P/CVE In Mombasa**. calls for a community of practice where these violent extremism and dilemmas can be refined further. The existing reporting systems enhances and or upgraded to win trust from the community, experiences shared and empirical theory built from practice.

Hence this tool is key for adoption to other counties for Gender Responsive Community-Led Early Warning, Early Response framework.

Betty Sharon

Executive Director

Collaboration of Women In Development –CWID




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The main purpose of this framework is to contribute to safe and adequate legal and policy environment that promote resilience to Violent Extremism in Mombasa County, a recommendation made to the County Government and National Government on the need to develop a Community Led Early Warning and Response System from a Baseline Survey on Gender and Countering Violent Extremism In Mombasa County (2019) funded by Forum CIV for the Wajibu Wetu Programme Phase 2 for the project **“Inua Mama Initiative”** whose objective is to empower Women, Young men and Communities to resist the appeal of Violent Extremism.

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in its quest to support the County Action Plan for PCVE in Mombasa funded the implementation of the Community Led Early Warning and Early Response Framework for Countering Violent Extremism for the project **“Putting Citizens at The Heart of CVE in Mombasa”**, this is a system that is intended for national and county public and private agencies responsible for the prevention and management of violent extremism. It is also hoped that this system will serve as a model and reference tool to guide the other counties in designing similar systems to combat violent extremism. This System does not claim to be a unique or universal recipe, and therefore it may be improved based on lessons learnt and best practices from other parts of the world.



CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXT

Global Context

In June 2001 the United Nations (UN) Secretary General issued his Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Central to the report was the argument that 'prevention should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective'. However, despite the existing wealth of information and analysis on the issues of conflict, there is still a need to make early warning and conflict prevention operational. Early warning and early response (EWER) is considered one of the pillars of operational conflict prevention. Practiced by international organisations, research institutes and NGOs, EWER has advanced our knowledge of conflicts and our strategies to address them. Yet, substantial gaps remain in this pioneering and experimental field necessitating further research and debate.

Early warning and early response has become an important tool for the practitioners of conflict prevention and peacebuilding since the 1990s when asymmetric warfare, most of it occurring within the borders of the nation state, escalated in the post–Cold War era in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Over the decades, EWER has evolved as a specialized field of practice with its approach and methodologies going through various stages of evolutionary processes, particularly in terms of who should be involved in EWER, and how response systems must be framed.

Inclusion of local communities and civil society organizations

EWER system becomes more effective and accurate if the “locals” are involved in collecting and analyzing EWER indicators. There are example of how promoting local agencies in monitoring the indicators of radicalization has prevented young people from being recruited into violent extremism (VE). In Germany, for instance, the “Mothers for Life” network, which was formed by the German Institute for Radicalization and Deradicalization, provides a platform for mothers who have experienced violent *jihadist* radicalization in their own families.

The mothers, who are invaluable resources for preventing radicalization and VE, have played commendable roles to identify early warning indicators of radicalization in their social and cultural contexts, and have, in turned, contributed to preventing youth from being engaged in extremist violence. The other example comes from Yogyakarta in Indonesia, where the Gusdurian network has created a secure platform for dialogue that brings youth together to discuss and debate religious identity and respect and celebrate the diversity of young Muslims.

See European Centre for Conflict Prevention (2006) Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. Available at <https://gppac.net/files/2018-12/Early%20Warning%20and%20Early%20Response.pdf>



This platform is seen as a positive contribution by youth to demystify religious identity and foster social solidarity among Muslim youth so as to mobilize local resources to prevent radicalization and recruitment of youth into VE. In Nepal, Armed Violence Reduction and Strengthening Community Security (AVRSCS) Program, a joint initiative by the United Nations Development Program and the Government of Nepal, simultaneously enhanced youth's capacity for community security while providing the youth with dignified space to work for violence prevention in their own community.

In the Philippines, the Nonviolent Peace Force supported the establishment of a citizen-led EWER mechanism in line with the concept of the third generation EWER system, as part of its civilian peacekeeping program. The EWER mechanism did not only collect and analyse information for early warning, but it also facilitated inter-group collaboration, which eventually culminated in the formation of the Bantay Ceasefire monitoring group and later became the part of the International Monitoring Team (IMT).

Closer to home, In October 2014, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) developed a set of indicators for monitoring violent extremism and religious fundamentalism in West Africa and the Sahel in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite some limitations, this EWER system has produced some results in terms of lobbying and policy advocacy at the regional level regarding preventive action against violent extremism in West Africa.

In East and the Horn of Africa, Local civil society organizations (CSOs) were integral partners in every step of the formation and launch of the East Africa Civil Society Organizations Hub (CSO Hub) which is a network of nearly 160 civil society organizations engaging in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Its objectives are to support and deepen regional civil society relationships and collaboration, strengthen programming capacities, identify and map new and grassroots P/CVE actors, and develop a representative voice for civil society to engage with governments, regional bodies, and international actors on the development of P/CVE policies and programs.

Use of Technology

The cases from Africa, Asia and Latin America demonstrate clearly that employing new technologies (including cell phones, social media, crowdsourcing, crisis mapping, blogging, and big data analytics) for conflict prevention can produce very different results depending on the context in which they are applied and whether or not those using the technology take that context into account. This is particularly true in light of the dramatic changes underway in the landscapes of violence and conflict on a global level.

Engelbrecht, Georgi and Vidushi Kaushik (2015). Community-Based Protection Mechanisms. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 27(1): 43–51. See Samuel, Thomas Koruth. 2016. *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A selected case study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*. Kuala Lumpur: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) DB Subedi (2017) Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism, *Peace Review*, 29:2, 135-143.



In Latin America, there is anecdotal evidence of some vertical ICT interventions (citizens to government) generating important reductions in homicidal violence and improved intelligence and rationalization of police forces. There is an apparent rapid growth in ICT use for violence prevention which is, in turn, suggestive of a wider appetite. An increasing number of public entities - police and metropolitan authorities are the tip of the iceberg - are actively enhancing their capabilities.

While in some cases proceeding cautiously owing to structural concerns with transparency, it is now accepted wisdom that (especially mobile) ICTs - including the use of crowdsourcing, geospatial and geothermal mapping, and other data fusion techniques - are essential to map hot spots, prioritize resources, plan interventions, and assess outcomes. Likewise, citizen groups are experimenting with frontline data harvesting techniques and paving the way for a new generation of big-data research.

In Asia, reports demonstrated that ICT-driven early warning systems in Kyrgyzstan did not work in times of crisis: although plenty of warning existed, neither the government nor the international community took any decisive action. Reports show that if early-warning information goes against the interests and priorities of those who hold power at the state level, it is likely to be ignored. "Early warning is good only if action follows."⁶⁸ While an early-warning mantra continues to dominate thinking on conflict prevention, a glaring gap between warning and response persists.

Kenyan Contexts

Kenya has traditionally dependent on state and inter-governmental agencies in monitoring and responding to violent conflict. This securitized approach has been reported to yield less result. This up-bottom approach has resulted into more fear, animosity and tension between community, civil society and at-risk individuals on one hand and state agencies on the other hand.

This means that most information and indicators may fail to be reported to decision makers due the above factors. A Study Report by Search for Common Ground revealed that the at-risk victims prefer confiding in friends and family member rather than state agencies thus the need for bottom-up approach towards prevention of violent conflict.

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. 2014. Stakeholders' Meeting to Develop Early Warning Indicators on Violent Extremism in West Africa. Lagos, Nigeria. October 21–22 See the Summary Report of CSO Hub available at https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FINAL_Summary-Report_CS0-Hub-NationalMeetings.pdf

See also Steven Dudley, "Vigilante Blogs Leave Bloody Trail in Guatemala," In Sight Crime, Wednesday 7, 2011, available at www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/vigilante-blogs-leave-bloody-trail-in-guatemala

See María Isabel Bavidziuk and María Alejandra Davidziuk (2009), "Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia: Cross-country Study on Violence Against Women and Information Communication Technologies," available at www.genderit.org/sites/default/upload/APC_WNSP_MDG3_VAW_ICT_en_lac_dec2009_1.pdf

See Robert Muggah and Albert Souza Mulli (February 2012), "Rio Tries Counterinsurgency," Current History 111, No. 742

See Initiative for Peacebuilding (2012) Early Warning and Conflict prevention by the EU: Learning lessons from the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya



Inclusion of CSOs and local communities

CSO-led initiatives have also been on rise to reinforce NSC initiatives. They work closely with District Peace Committee (DPCs) and in many areas share the same field and peace monitors with NSC. For instance, PeaceNet Kenya, uses peace monitors based in partner organisations, especially in Rift Valley and other hotspot areas, to collect and relay information to processing centres at the PeaceNet secretariat, or directly to NSC and NRI. An EU-funded project, run by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, supports CSO activities to monitor conflict trends through a set of indicators in Nyanza and parts of Rift Valley (largely affected by conflict) and report to coordination centres at PeaceNet and NSC. These CSOs rely on Frontline SMS and Crowd map Platforms, which use SMS, emails, websites, tweets and other social media to collect and relay information. Responses emanating from information shared by CSOs are coordinated by NSC through peace committees and provincial administration. To this extent, CSOs' conflict early warning information reinforces information collected by NSC field and peace monitors. It is important to note that, in some instances, based on the weight and urgency of alerts, action is taken at the district (local) level by the provincial administration without necessarily being prompted by NSC.

Case Studies

The use of innovative information communication technology in early warning in Kenya is a new phenomenon. Its adoption has been largely ad hoc and experimental, with an initial focus on limited geographical spaces, or hot spots. The national policy on peace building and conflict management, which has been in development for more than seven years, does not foresee its use at a structural level.

The Case of UWIANO@108 platforms

Uwiano Kenya @ 108 is a public platform to engage Kenyans in adding their voice to peacebuilding efforts in Kenya. The platform is based on a crowdsourcing process: Uwiano 108 receives violation reports and requests for assistance from the general public in Kenya through SMS (short-code 108); email (report@nscpeace.go.ke); Twitter([@Uwiano108](https://twitter.com/Uwiano108)); Facebook (Amani Kenya) or through direct entry on the website via our reports page. It is a public initiative by the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (Office of the President), which was established with the aid of the United Nations Development Programme-Kenya.

The services are free of charge to the public, available on a 24-hour basis and are meant to inform any interested stakeholders of incidents and developments on an almost real-time basis. According to one interviewee at NSC, in most of cases where the platform received information and mobilised action during the 2010 referendum, tensions were eased and disputes resolved which might otherwise have turned violent.


See Search for Common Grounds (2018) Understanding Individuals At-Risk: A Common Ground Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya. Available at <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Meet-me-at-the-Maskani-Policy-Brief.pdf>



As a result, such approaches are now being enhanced and promoted as a key component of the early warning and peacebuilding mechanism in Kenya. The Platform is managed through a Situation Room at NSC with data clerks and analysts, where information received from the platform is analysed, verified and disseminated to relevant actors for response. Some of the information is also shared with the Kenya Police and Provincial Administrations. In cases requiring mediation, for example where the alerts indicate tensions, the information is sent to DPCs for targeted mediation and dialogue interventions.

The incidences received are reflected in the incident map which can show hotspot area as shown in the screenshot below.

Figure 1: UWIANO@108 system



Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN)

The Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism sits within the broader Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisation which brings together Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. This was established in 2002 and is located in Addis Ababa. CEWARN's mandate is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts, as well as their escalation and outbreak in the IGAD region, undertake analysis of the information, develop case scenarios and formulate options for response.

For more information on Amani Kenya @ 108, see <http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/108/> and on the Ushahidi platform, see <http://www.ushahidi.com/>




In undertaking their tasks in early warning and early response, country coordinators use the CEWARN Reporter. The CEWARN Reporter is a network software program specifically designed for early-warning purposes and used by the country coordinators to enter and store the standardized field reports submitted to them by the field monitors. The reports submitted by the field monitors are based on a set of security audit questions (indicators) that monitor local issues, including communal relations, peace and security, natural disasters and resources use, economic activities, civil society activities, and community movement.

The CEWARN Reporter has fifty-seven indicator questions that serve to monitor factors that accelerate, trigger, and/or mitigate violent incidents. Based on the data gathered in the field, the following reports are produced: alerts on impending violence, situation briefs (as needed), quarterly country updates, and cluster reports. The reports generated are shared with each national Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit for response actions.

The System has been modified from the old by:

- a) Expansion of the data collection system from sole dependence on independent Field Monitors to include SMS-based crowd sourcing and engagement with CSO networks;
- b) Expansion of the scope of early warning data collected from sole focus on incident and situation reports to include media reports; SMS-based field observation reports; GIS information; information from social media and structural data; and Setting up situation rooms in all Member States to beef up national CEWERUS' early warning capacity and engaging with wider network of National Research Institutes (NRIs) to beef up analysis

The figure below summarizes the structure.



See Initiative for Peacebuilding (2012) above "CEWARN Strategy (2007-2011)," Addis Ababa: CEWARN Unit, November 2006, pg 3




Mulika Uhalifu

Mulika Uhalifu is a platform that promotes and facilitates citizen participation in National Security and Service Delivery. It is an Integrated Information Delivery System configured to act as a virtual report desk; enabling mobile phone users in Kenya to report incidents of conflict, insecurity and poor service delivery anonymously without fear of reprisals. The Platform makes use of SMS, the MULIKA App, and an online portal where citizens send information on crimes and service delivery.

The report is replicated immediately to relevant government security agencies. One report sent is received by over 100 relevant officers for transparency and accountability. The platform is disseminated through, public meetings, local media stations, and social media. We have linked more than 700 senior security officers who include: county and sub-county intelligence security committees. Through this virtual report desk, these teams have been receiving raw unedited intelligence reports directly from the citizens and have been acting on the information.

The system so far has processed more than 100,000 reports in less than one year. The cases vary from GBV, muggings, illicit brews, drugs, communal violence, hate speech, radicalization to police misconduct. According to security chiefs, in the operating counties, this initiative has been able to actualize community policing. The platforms process supports coordination, decision making, and police deployment at the national, county and community level in addressing reported crime. The multi-agencies operate within a coordinated protocol headed by the chairs of the county and sub-county committees and they recognize internal hierarchy. Once a Mulika alert has been reported, it is handled by relevant teams within the security committees. Each agency plays a role without conflict or duplication.

Figure 3: MULIKA App



Mombasa County Early Warning System

Mombasa County has developed an early warning system for reporting suspicious or criminal activities. The early warning system is hosted at a Situation Room under the Inspectorate Department. The system uses toll free lines: 0707911911, 0788911911, 0775911911, 0736256969, 0756911911. The early warning is management through a Disaster Management team.

Figure 5: Mombasa Emergency helplines



Early Warning – A Retrospective

Early Warning & Early Response

Early Warning is defined as the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making. In order to achieve the purpose, Early Warning follows the four steps given below:

- 1) Collection of data (using specific indicators)
- 2) Analysis of the data (attaching meaning to indicators, setting it in context, recognition of crisis development)
- 3) Formulation of best/worst scenarios and response options
- 4) Communication to decision makers

On the other hand, Early Response (Action) which is often used in conjunction with 'Early Warning' refers to either 'preventive action' or 'early response action'. According to Diller, early response is defined as a "process of consultation, policymaking, planning, and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict.

The processes include: (a) diplomatic/political; (b) military/security, (c) humanitarian; and (d) development/economic activity. These responses or actions are delivered by early/rapid response systems, which “are one or several preventive instruments and mechanisms (political, economic/financial, social, security) informed by an early warning that are deployed to manage, resolve, or prevent the outbreak, escalation, and resurgence of violent conflict”. From this background, it can be deduced that there exist various kinds of Early Response (ER) actors including global intergovernmental organizations, regional governments, individual governments, NGOs, individuals and so on.

Generations of Early Warning

A review of the types of early warning systems and how definitions have evolved, along with a reflection on lessons learnt from early warning and response over the last few decades, is useful to understand how the sector has grown and what challenges remain. The 1994 Rwandan genocide was a key trigger for the evolution of the conflict early warning field. Over time, it led to three generations of early warning systems, each with a specific mandate, organisational set-up, information sources/analytical methods, links to response decision-making, and strengths and weaknesses.

It must be noted with maximum attention that this definition means that the EW system itself is 'the systematic collection and analysis of information' rather than 'giving a warning. According to EUISS study on crisis rooms three generations of early warning systems are identified namely: first generation, second generation and third generation. In a nutshell, the first generation early warning systems are the systems where the entire early warning mechanism (including conflict monitoring) was based outside the conflict region (“Headquarter-based”) namely, in the West.

The second Generation conducts monitoring within conflict countries and regions but analysis is still conducted outside conflict countries (the West). Finally, the third generation early warning systems are entirely located in the conflict regions. They integrate EW and ER together as simultaneous processes. The figure below summarizes the three generations of early warning signs. Figure 6: Three Generations of EarlyWarning.

Schmid, A. (2000), Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. Forum on Early Warning & Early Response (FEWER) OECD (2009), 'Preventing Violence, War, and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response', (Paris: OECD/DAC) See Safeworld (2015), Early warning and response to violent conflict: Time for a rethink?

See more at Austin, A. (2004) “Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Available: <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/> See www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Crisis_Rooms.pdf For further details, see Rupesinghe, K. (2005) “A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security”. Paper presented at the Global Conference on the “Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding”, 19-21st July 2005



	Mandate	Organisational set-up	Information sources/ analytical methods	Link to decision-making and response	Strengths and weaknesses
First generation <i>Often exclusive focus on providing internal client with crisis information/ analysis (e.g. EU Crisis Room)</i>	Crisis prediction Evidence for decision-making	Centralised/ HQ-based Information management team Analysts Information/ analysis infrastructure	Mixed (open, grey, black) sources Quantitative and qualitative methods	Internal client base Warning and analytical products	Stronger institutional ownership of information and analysis Information sharing outside institution is difficult due to information used Limited integration into response decision-making
Second generation <i>Broader set of internal and affiliated clients that require crisis information/ analysis and options for response that speak to specific response instruments (e.g. ECOWAS/EWS)</i>	Crisis prediction Evidence for decision-making Priority-setting inputs	Centralised/ HQ-based and field networks Information management team Analysts Information/ analysis infrastructure	Mixed (mostly open) sources Quantitative and qualitative methods GIS applications	Internal and external client base Warning and analytical products Watch list products Provision of response options Operational link to response instruments	Quality of information improves because of field networks Information sharing with partners is easier due to use of mainly open source data Response options may not reflect response capacities; response mechanisms are slow
Third generation <i>Internal and external clients that are drawn into crisis response strategy formulation and micro-level response role for information network (e.g. IGAD/CEWARN)</i>	Crisis prediction Evidence for decision-making Priority-setting inputs Active support of response	HQ team and strong field units Combined information and response teams Analysts Information/ analysis infrastructure	Open sources Quantitative and qualitative methods GIS applications	Internal and external client base Warning and analytical products Facilitation of response strategies Field-level responses	Stronger ability to capture real time information on sub-national conflicts Stronger field-level reach and ability to respond fast Geographical coverage is limited; cross-border conflict systems may remain unaddressed

Source: Nyheim, D (2014), 'Crisis rooms: towards a global network?', EU Institute for Security Studies, p 15



CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPING MOMBASA COUNTY EWER FRAMEWORK

Factors to Consider while establishing an EWER Framework

Designers should develop two series of questions at the preliminary stage, before starting to construct the System. The first set of questions is linked to factors that contribute to the sustainability of the EWS/EWRS and the second set addresses specific design issues.

Guiding questions for establishing the sustainability of an EWRS

What political support does the System have?

Any EWER Framework that has the support of the highest authorities of the government/institution or organization that will implement it may have more leeway for action and institutional and political legitimacy, thereby obtaining better results. Political support may be fundamental for:

- Access to key sources of information
- Cooperation with other public entities
- Facilitating adequate interinstitutional coordination (horizontal and vertical)
- Guaranteeing access to the highest decision-making levels

This System needs to have political support from: Mombasa County (Office of the Governor) and Office of the County Commissioner (who are jointly the co-chairs of MCAP); National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC); and Office of the Inspector General of Police.

Currently, the EWER has received political support from the County Commissioner, Assistant County Commissioner, County Department of Youth and Resilience (Counter Violent Extremism).

Where is the System located institutionally?

The place assigned to the EWER system within the institutional architecture is a political and strategic decision. It reflects the weight that will be assigned to the System and sends a message to the other institutions about how they should treat it and relate to it. In other words, the place given to the System in the state apparatus is an initial message about its significance and recognition. Appropriate institutional anchoring of an EWER:

- Facilitates access to sources of State and civil society information.
- Facilitates interinstitutional cooperation and coordination at different levels (local, regional and national).
- Ensures direct access to the highest political decision-making levels.

This System can be hosted either by Mombasa County (Office of the Governor), Office of the County Commissioner, or any NGO.

For details See UNDP (2016) Practical Guide: Early Warning and Response Systems Design for Social Conflicts



After fruitful deliberations and assessment of current practices from other counties in Kenya, the County Commissioner volunteered to host the EWER Framework (at County Commissions Situation Room) on condition that the final framework/system is formatted to fit within the desired design. The Technical Committee resolved to have a face to face meeting with the County Commissioner to agree on the right formatting and way forward. In addition, the team agreed to visit the County Situation Room as case study.

What financial resources does the System have available?

The success of EWER system depends not only on obtaining an adequate budget, but also, and especially, on the possibility of continuous and constant financial resources that are available when needed. Administrative delays may affect the continuity of the work stages and the effectiveness of actions. However, it is worth noting that innovative or creative ways may be adopted to ensure minimal expenditure is incurred during implementation. For instance, an EWER anchored on already existing structures may involve less funds in its implementation.

The Technical Committee resolved as follows:

- a) *A Crowdsourcing system needs to be developed with a hotline or codes for calls and sms.*
- b) *More funds will be needed for dissemination and community awareness/education to enhance knowledge of indicators and hotline/code) County Government may support the system with Equipment of funding through collaborative resource mobilization.*



CHAPTER THREE

COMMUNITY-LED EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE SYSTEM

The Key Elements

The objective of community-led EWER systems is to empower individuals and communities threatened by hazards to act in sufficient time and in an appropriate manner to reduce the possibility of personal injury, loss of life and damage to property and the environment. This System will comprise of four (4) elements as discussed below.

RISK KNOWLEDGE

These include all RISK FACTORS that make an individual vulnerable to recruitment, radicalization or take part in terrorism

An individual possessing the risk factors should be monitored until an indicator is registered?

DISSEMINATION AND REPORTING

Once SIGNS are established, then community member(s) need to identify where such incident need to be reported

INDICATORS (EARLY WARNING SIGNS)

These are SIGNS that may help to assess whether an individual is actually involved in recruitment, radicalization or terrorism.

An individual from whom any indicator is registered must be reported to the relevant agency

DISSEMINATION AND REPORTING

Once SIGNS are established, then community member(s) need to identify where such incident need to be reported



RISK FACTORS

The following list shows a number of risk factors that may make an individual vulnerable to radicalization, recruitment and terrorism.

Being a widow/widower of suspected terrorist or gang member	Being a son/daughter of a suspected terrorist or gang member
Having a History of Criminal Violence	Being Unemployed
Sudden conversion into Islam	Having a Sporadic Work History
Involving With a Gang or Delinquent Peers	Having Less Education
Having a Terrorist Friend	Having a Lower Social Economic Status
Being a Member of an Extremist Group for an Extended Period	Failing to Achieve One's Aspirations
Having a Deep Commitment to an Extremist Ideology	Having Trouble in Romantic/ Platonic Relationships
Having Psychological Issues	Being Distant From One's Family
Being Socially Isolated	Having military or police experience
Having been discharged dishonourably from military/police/security forces	Having Extremist Ideology/Grievances
Having extreme interest in websites or social platforms hosted by extremist groups	Defending suspected terrorists

Risk factor a is something that **increases the likelihood** that a certain outcome will occur, in this case that an individual will engage or attempt to engage in terrorism.



INDICATORS

The following are SIGNS that an individual is engaging or attempting to engage in terrorism. It is worth noting that individuals showing or doing any of the following should be reported to the relevant government agency for further monitoring and decision.

Attending extremist group meetings

Producing Public Statements About Extremist Ideology or Grievance

Publicly Expressing a Desire to Hurt Others

Verbalizing Intent to Family or Friends

Broadcasting Intent

Stockpiling Weapons

Others Are Aware of Individual's Extremist Ideology

Others Are Aware of Individual's Grievance

Constant or frequent communication with an extremist group or terrorist



Indicators are **signs** suggesting that an individual is engaging or attempting to engage in terrorism



CHAPTER FOUR

DISSEMINATION/REPORTING AND RESPONSE/ACTION

The main purpose of disseminating is to warn decision-makers. Early warnings are sent to decision makers through pre-established channels. Thereafter, it is upon the decision-maker to determine the seriousness of the threat and its possible impact. These pre-established channels are pivotal in the implementation of any Early Warning Early Response System. However, a number of factors affect the type of reporting channel that may be used at any one time. The factors include but not limited to

- a) Accessibility
- b) Response to action
- c) Confidentiality and privacy of community members
- d) Fear of amniyats/ fear of retaliation

Proposed Reporting Options

Based on the deliberations and resolutions by the Technical Committee, the community members will be expected to report through:

National Police Service

The Anti - terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) is a unit within the Directorate of Criminal investigation mandated to mitigate and investigate terrorism related cases in the country. The Unit has the following roles:

- To prevent, disrupt and interdict terrorist activities within the country.
- To investigate all terrorism related cases.
- To lead other agencies at all scenes of terrorist related incidents.
- To create profiles for suspected terrorists and keep an updated databank.
- To share intelligence with other stakeholders.
- To review and monitor security of vital installations and soft targets.
- To sensitize the public on terrorism awareness on need basis.

Members of the public can make reports directly to any nearest police station or post. The person reporting will thereafter directed appropriately.

Anonymous Reporting Information System (ARIS)

The National Police Service introduced an internal reporting system under the Internal Affairs Unit known as the Anonymous Reporting Information System. Under the system, Kenyans can send a toll free message on 40683 or call 0800721230 after which they will be provided with a tracking code for their complaints. One can also download the Anonymous Reporting Information System application on their Android phones.

The original idea (under the pilot phase) was to use the system for the public to complain



The big question is whether IAU can make the same flexible for reporting of violent extremism cases

Office of County Commissioner

The County Commissioner plays central role on security matters at county level. Among the key roles include:

- Mobilise resources across counties to support security operations.
- Arbitrate conflicts or security threats across counties
- Co-chairs County Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism
- A member of County Security Committee

Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs

- Mobilize resources within the location and sub-location levels to support security operations
- Prevent crimes within the location and sub-location levels
- Support implementation of County Action Plans on CVE within the location and sub-location levels
- chairs security meetings at location and sub-location levels 0701524719

Religious Leaders/Faith-Based Organizations

Understanding how religious factors affect violent extremism can help inform the design and implementation of CVE solutions that engage the religious sector. Globally, Kenya represented, Islam has been at the centre of radicalization debate. Several Muslim leaders have always come out to support efforts towards de-radicalization. Studies have shown that Sheikhs play critical role in de-radicalization agenda. Specifically, religious leader can play the following roles:

- Public Education on de-radicalization through madrasas, weekly summons etc.
- Sharing intelligence with relevant government agencies
- Support relevant state agencies in re-integration of returnees and reformed youth

Civil Society Organization (CSOs)

It is first important to understand who the CSOs are. In general, civil society is best understood as a diverse body of civil actors, communities, and formal or informal associations with a wide range of roles, who engage in public life seeking to advance shared values and objectives. Civil society actors typically include: community leaders and groups; grassroots associations; religious leaders and faith-based organizations; online groups and social media communities; international, local and grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGO); labour unions and professional associations; charitable and philanthropic foundations; academic and research institutions. CSOs can play several roles ranging from preventive to rehabilitation. The key roles played by CSOs include:

- Offering psychosocial support to victims of violent extremism
- Sharing intelligence with relevant state agencies
- Support in public awareness against violent extremism



- Building capacity of key stakeholders to combat violent extremism
- Support state agencies in rehabilitation of reformed youth and returnees

Community Policing Committees (CPC) / Nyumba Kumi

The CPC recognizes voluntary participation of the local community in the maintenance of peace and which acknowledges that the police need to be responsive to the communities and their needs, its key element being joint problem identification and problem-solving, while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime prevention and maintaining order.

In this regard it plays the following functions in crime prevention:

- Crime mapping and record keeping
- Crime evaluation surveys
- Youth Crisis Intervention programs
- Rehabilitation and reintegration of reformed gang members
- Community awareness programmes

Response Capability

The main question in this part is whether the actor receiving the report is ready and has the capacity to respond effectively. Upon receipt of the warning, the actor is expected to evaluate the level of threat and where possible either conduct investigations or escalate the matter further to the next relevant actor with capacity. Any escalation is expected to be sent together with the early warnings received from community members. Response may vary depending on the circumstances of each case. However, the general responses and action may include:

- a) Further investigations and monitoring
- b) Immediate Arrests and incarceration
- c) Warning to suspect
- d) Referral to psychosocial support
- e) Enrolment into governments returnees program



CHAPTER FIVE

MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF EWER

The main aim of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is to ensure that EWER teams assess the impact of the Framework and the quality of responses for two purposes: to identify challenges, gaps that could lead to increased radicalization, and to improve overall Frameworks efficiency.

Evaluation of the Framework can focus on the outcome of the process or on specific stages. Evaluation of the result of the process should focus on the impact of the warning.

When carrying out an evaluation, the following aspects must be assessed:

- Usefulness of the warning signs/indicators for deciding whether to take action or not in a specific situation
- The transmission/reporting process
- The effectiveness of the response or actions

Evaluation Process

Evaluation can be made through various methodologies namely:

- Review Forums with key stakeholders. In the case of Mombasa County
- EWER, the County Engagement Forums on CVE
- Separate Key Informant interviews with decision makers.
- Interviews with community members



CHAPTER SIX

USERS OF EWER FRAMEWORK

The amount, type and final design of EWER Framework depend on who the final recipients are. The question as to who needs the Framework can have a variety of answers. While the citizens may need the Framework to protect the lives, physical integrity and property, the state and non-state actors may need it because they have duties to perform - for appropriate and efficient decision-making. The table below summarizes the concept of users of the Framework.

Questions	Government and CSOs	Citizens
Who needs EWER Framework?	County Government of Mombasa, National Police Service, NCTC, County Commissioners, Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Religious leaders, NGOs, Community Policing Committees	Community members in hot-spot areas of violent extremism; Community members not within violent extremism hotspots
Why?	Obligations to fulfil - They have to take decisions to prevent violent extremism and terrorism	To have the knowledge – to save their lives and guarantee physical integrity.



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Personal Notes

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